Network Coding versus Replication Based Resilient Techniques to Mitigate Insider Attacks for Smart Metering by Brunisholz, Pierre et al.
Research Article
Network Coding versus Replication Based Resilient Techniques
to Mitigate Insider Attacks for Smart Metering
Pierre Brunisholz,1 Ochirkhand Erdene-Ochir,2 Mohamed Abdallah,3,4 Khalid Qaraqe,3
Marine Minier,5 and Fabrice Valois5
1 INP, LIG, CNRS UMR, 5217 Grenoble, France
2Department of Electrical Engineering, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar
3Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Texas A&M University at Qatar, Doha, Qatar
4Department of Electrical and Communications Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University, Giza, Egypt
5INRIA, INSA-Lyon, CITI, Universite´ de Lyon, 69621 Lyon, France
Correspondence should be addressed to Marine Minier; marine.minier@insa-lyon.fr
Received 18 December 2014; Accepted 7 June 2015
Academic Editor: Chao Song
Copyright © 2015 Pierre Brunisholz et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
The main focus of this paper is the resilience of communication protocols for data gathering in distributed, large scale, and dense
networks. In our previouswork, we have proposed the resilientmethods based on randombehavior and data replications to improve
route diversification, thus to take advantage of redundant network structure. Following these previous methods, we propose in this
paper a new resilient method based on network coding techniques to improve resilience in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
for smart metering applications. More precisely, using our resilience metric based on a performance surface, we compare several
variants of a well-known gradient based routing protocol with the previous methods (random routing and packet replications) and
the new proposedmethods (two network coding techniques).The proposedmethods outperformed the previous methods in terms
of data delivery success even in the presence of high attack intensity.
1. Introduction
Recent advances in wireless communications and electronics
have developed a next generation of distributed, large scale,
and dense networks. In particular, Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs) have become popular for smart metering to gather
data from multifunctional sensor nodes communicating at
short distance to collect and transmit data to one or more
data collectors. WSNs have well-known features such as
low-power consumption, changing topology awareness, open
noisy environment, and unreliable radio links. This leads
to possible collisions and interferences which makes data
gathering a real challenge. In addition, the nature of wireless
communication medium of the smart devices combined
with their deployment in an open environment makes them
vulnerable to malicious attacks.
An outsider attacker could eavesdrop on communi-
cations and alter transmitted messages. Smart electronic
devices deployed in an unattended and possibly hostile
environment for resource monitoring enable physical attacks
and their resource limitations (computation, energy, and
communication) could ease node tampering. Due to node
compromise, numerousmalicious insider attacks are possible
such as injecting bad data to the network to manipulate
control actions and providemultipleDenial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks to disrupt data gathering process for monitoring.
The main focus of this paper is the resilience of such
constrained networks for data gathering. Resilience study
encompasses a wide range of multidisciplinary research
topics and is still a relatively new concept in networking.
Recently, in works on the resilience of Internet, several
concomitant domains (fault tolerance, security, survivability,
etc.) were jointly considered in [1–4], where the lack of a
metric and a valid definition of the resilience in networking is
underlined. Resilience of routing protocols has been defined
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as their ability to absorb the performance degradation under
some failure pattern (random or intentional) and to continue
delivering messages with an increasing number of 𝑘 com-
promised nodes in [5]. This definition introduces an analogy
related to the original definition of resilience in mechanics
which characterizes the properties of the materials to resist a
shock.
In our previous work, a quantitative metric was proposed
in [5] and several resilient routing techniques such as Ran-
domGradient Based Routing (RS-GBR) and RandomGradi-
ent Based Routing with Replication (RM-GBR) were studied
in [6]. They consist of three main features: (i) introduction
of random behavior, (ii) limitation of route length, and (iii)
data replication. Random behaviors increase uncertainty for
an adversary, making the protocols unpredictable. Limiting
the route length is necessary to reduce the probability of
a data packet meeting a malicious insider along the route.
Data replication allows route diversification between the
smart devices and the data collector, thus improving the
delivery success rate and the fairness of the network. Such
techniques are particularly interesting for smart metering to
take advantage of the redundant topology created through
wireless medium.
The originality and novelty of this paper is introducing
a new resilient routing technique based on network cod-
ing mechanisms to exploit data redundancy, thus to take
advantage of the route diversity inherently present in wireless
networks.Network coding [7] provides an interlacedmultiple
packets generation process, where each packet possesses a
part of the data information a source node wants to route
to the data collector. The network coding techniques are
well investigated [7]; however, to our knowledge, this is the
first study applying those techniques to resilience context
to improve routing protocols against insider attacks. The
objective is thus to compare the proposed network coding
techniques with the data replication mechanisms studied
previously [8] in terms of our resilience metric [5].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
gives an overview of the attack categories in smart meter-
ing. In Section 3, the previous resilient methods are pre-
sented including random behavior and packet replications.
In Section 4, we propose new resilient methods based on
network coding techniques. Section 5 defines the resilience
metric, assumptions, and simulation parameters followed
by the results and comparative analysis. Finally, Section 6
concludes this paper and outlines future work directions.
2. Attack Categories
This section introduces the main attack categories in smart
metering communication network according to the ontology
introduced in [9].
According to its capabilities an attacker can be charac-
terized as laptop-class and mote-class. A laptop-class attacker
may have access to powerful devices with more compu-
tational resources. A single laptop-class attacker might be
able to eavesdrop on and/or jam the entire network. In
smart metering infrastructure, mote-class attacker with no
resource advantages over legitimate nodes is also possible
because an ordinary smart device can be captured and
compromised.
According to its intent an attacker can be characterized
as passive and active. A passive attacker attempts to learn
or make use of information from a system but does not
affect system resources. For example, passive eavesdropping
that simply gathers information can compromise privacy
and confidentiality. An active attacker attempts to alter
system resources or affect system operations. Compared
to the passive attacker, here the goal is to produce DoS
attacks to disrupt communication by destroying links or
exhaust available resources such as bandwidth or energy.
Such attacks are challenging for smart metering, which relies
on reliable data gathering from smart devices for resource
monitoring.
According to point of initiation an attacker can be charac-
terized as outsider and insider. An outsider attack is initiated
from the outside of the security perimeter by an unauthorized
or illegitimate user of the system. For instance, jamming,
eavesdropping, and injecting replayed or fabricated messages
are examples of such attacks. An insider attack is one that
is initiated by an entity inside the security perimeter, that
is, an entity that is authorized to access system resources
but uses them in a way not approved by the party that
granted the authorization.This is possible for smart metering
because an attacker could tamper low cost network devices
like smart meters deployed in an open and unattended
environment. Such attacks are particularly critical for smart
metering because an insider attacker could inject false data
to manipulate control actions and/or provide numerous DoS
attacks such as selective forwarding, Sinkhole, Sybil, node
replication, and Wormhole to disrupt data gathering process
[10].
In this paper, we deal with an attacker that has no
resource advantages over legitimate devices because ordinary
network nodes could be captured and compromised by an
adversary. We deal with an insider attacker (physical attacks
on electronic devices deployed in an open environment), who
is authorized to access network resources but uses them in
an inappropriate way. An adversary is active: he/she attempts
to alter network resources and/or affect network operations
especially at routing layer.
3. Previous Resilient Methods
Most of the routing protocols for data gathering in smart
metering are deterministic, based on the “best” route selec-
tion criterion to be efficient. For instance, the RPL routing
protocol standard adopted by IETF in March 2012 favors the
most “stable” routes [11]. As a result, the same route is used
to deliver all data packets of a source to a destination. Its
sensitivity to faults and attacks has been shown in [12, 13].
Note that the packet delivery success and failure are not
fairly distributed among the network nodes; some nodes
will have good delivery ratio and others will be completely
disconnected. This is a limitation of the protocol, since the
redundant topology created by wireless communications is
not exploited to benefit from physically existing alternative
routes.
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In previous work, we have shown through simulations
in [6] and analytically in [14] that the random behavior
improves the resilience of communication protocols in the
presence of insider attacks. It increases uncertainty for an
adversary, making the protocols unpredictable. In addition,
it allows route diversity, as each data packet takes potentially
different routes thanks to the random selection of the next
hop. This enhances the connectivity between a source and a
destination.
When the random route selection is combined with
data replication, the delivery success of each data packet is
improved thanks to the route diversity and data redundancy.
Based on these observations, to take advantage of data
redundancy and path diversity, thus to improve resilience,
we introduce a new resilient technique based on network
coding mechanisms. The main goal of this paper is to study
both data replication and network coding based techniques
and to compare them in terms of resilience against insider
attacks.
3.1. Random Behavior. We have proposed a theoretical
framework of the resilience based on the biased random
walks [14]. The theory of random walks is widely used in
various fields such as mathematics, physics, and telecommu-
nications. In networking, random walk is related mostly to a
data packet generated at a node, traveling randomly across the
network to reach a destination. Given a graph and a starting
node, a neighbor node is selected at random and a data packet
is sent to this neighbor; then again a neighbor of the current
node is selected at random, and the data packet is sent to it,
and so forth. The random sequence of nodes selected in this
way to route a data packet from a source to a destination is a
random walk on a graph [15].
In the context of networking, the traditional unbiased
random walks are not relevant due to their low performance
in average number of hops required to reach a destination
[16]. In unbiased random walk, no state information on the
direction is available and the probability of selecting the next
hop is uniform. Thus, a data packet could travel a long time
across the network before reaching a destination. A bias
could be introduced to random walks to reduce the route
length. Biased random walks study the influence of bias on
the stochastic process (random behavior) to determine its
influence on the performance of random walks. The most
biased random walk is based on the shortest path principle
allowing reaching the destination faster, while keeping a
random behavior.
Previously, we have introduced the random behavior
to the well-known gradient based routing (GBR) protocol
[6] considering different parameters for the route length.
Simulation results showed that introducing random selection
of the next hop to the GBR routing protocol based on shortest
paths improved the resilience against insider attacks without
bringing about a significant extra cost. However, despite
this improvement, the general shape of the average delivery
success curve was still concave down, reflecting a sensitivity
to insider attacks.Therefore, data replicationmechanisms are
necessary to provide data redundancy, thus, to increase the
delivery success of each data packet.
3.2. Data Replication. To improve the delivery success of
each message, the packet replication is introduced and
combined with random selection of the next hop. If the
original packet is lost, some replicated copies could reach the
destination successfully.The classical deterministic protocols
cannot take advantage of data replication as a source uses
the same route for all messages, whereas the randomized
variants may increase the delivery success thanks to multiple
routes.
In a previous study, we have studied several replication
methods such as replicating packets at the sources only, both
at the source and at each intermediate node along the route
[6], depending on the distance of a source to the destination
(distant nodes replicate more than closest nodes) [8], and so
forth. The best method that allows a good trade-off between
the data delivery success and the overheadwas the replication
at the sources only [8].
Even though the data replication combined with random
routing improves the resilience, it brings about an overhead.
Note that providing redundant data has an important cost
in terms of energy consumption. Now, the main goal is to
study othermechanisms to provide data redundancy and take
advantage of route diversity in the network. It seems to us
that the most intuitive method to provide data redundancy
is to introduce network coding mechanisms to improve the
resilience of routing protocols and compare this method to
the data replication methods studied previously.
4. The Proposed Resilient Methods
Still aiming at a delivery success improvement, we introduce
a new resilient method based on network coding instead
of packets replication. This version is still combined with
random next hop selection. The main idea is to generate
multiple coded packets from the data a node wants to send.
Each coded packet will contain a part of information from
the original one. Due to the random next hop selection, each
coded packet will take a different route, increasing the overall
delivery success rate. As soon as the data collector receives
enough coded packets, it decodes them in order to retrieve
the original data.
In order to understand how this version works, it is
important to give several definitions of network coding [7].
Basically, we can say that coding at a node in a network
is network coding, where coding means a causal mapping
from inputs to outputs.This definition has the inconvenience
of not distinguishing the network coding we are going
to speak about from the channel coding used in noisy
networks.
Wewill then define the network coding as coding at a node
in a network with error-free links. Moreover, this definition
helps us to make a difference between network coding and
source coding.
But this definition can be more specific, and if we are
considering that we are in packets networks, we can define
network coding as coding content of packets inside a node.
If we had a little generalization by saying that we apply
the coding above the physical layer, we can distinguish the
network coding function from the information theory. Then
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we base our work on the previous definition of network
coding.
There are two major versions of network coding: the
interflow network coding and the intraflow network coding
as shown in Figure 1. Interflow network coding consists in
coding different packets from various origins together to
create a packet containing information from all of them,
while intraflow network coding consists in creating multiple
coded packets from an original one. In this work, we focus
on intraflow network coding. More precisely, we will use
intraflow network coding based on random linear network
coding.
In packets networks, intraflow (intrasession) network
coding consists in dividing a message (a data packet) into
multiple submessages of the same size and then creating a lin-
ear dependency between them before transmitting [7].When
the data collector receives enough packets, it can recreate
the initial message, by resolving the linear system created by
the linearly independent subpackets. More precisely, random
linear network coding works as follows [7].
Step 1 (the packet subdivision). As we have seen before,
intrasession network coding relies on the division of a data
packet into a predefined number of the same sized packets.
Here, we consider a message as a chain of bits.
The initial source node has to split a data packet 𝑝 into 𝑘
packets 𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝑘 of 𝑛 bits as illustrated in Figure 2. This
implies that the original message has to be a multiple of 𝑛.
Usually, taking 𝑛 = 8 means that the required coefficients are
chosen in a Galois Field of size 28. This field size allows the
created packets to be linearly independent with a probability
𝑃 = 0.996, and every coefficient has the size of a 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒,
which is a good compromise between practicability and linear
independence [17].
Protocol header Encodingcoefficients Coded data
Figure 3: Encoded packet.
Step 2 (the coding coefficients choice). For each packet 𝑝𝑖,
the node has to randomly choose 𝑘󸀠 ≥ 𝑘 coefficients
⟨𝑐
1
𝑝𝑖
, 𝑐
2
𝑝𝑖
, . . . , 𝑐
𝑘
󸀠
𝑝𝑖
⟩ from a Galois Field GF(28) to form the
coefficients vector. To enhance performances, the coeffi-
cients are randomly picked in a precomputed Galois Field
table.
Step 3 (the coding). We put the previous vectors in a 𝑘 ∗ 𝑘󸀠
matrix to obtain the coefficients matrix:
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Then we create the encoded data 𝑌𝑗 using the formula
𝑌𝑗 = ∑
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑐
𝑗
𝑖
𝑝𝑖, with 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑘
󸀠, and obtained the following
matrices:
(
(
𝑐
1
1 𝑐
1
2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑐
1
𝑘
𝑐
2
1 𝑐
2
2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑐
2
𝑘
.
.
.
.
.
. d
.
.
.
𝑐
𝑘
󸀠
1 𝑐
𝑘
󸀠
2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑐
𝑘
󸀠
𝑘
)
)
󳨀→
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
[
𝑌1 =
𝑘
∑
𝑖=1
𝑐
1
𝑖
𝑝𝑖
𝑌2 =
𝑘
∑
𝑖=1
𝑐
2
𝑖
𝑝𝑖
.
.
.
𝑌𝑘󸀠 =
𝑘
∑
𝑖=1
𝑐
𝑘
󸀠
𝑖
𝑝𝑖
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
. (2)
Step 4 (the dissemination). Each encoded data 𝑌𝑗 is then
encapsulated with its coefficients vector ⟨𝑐𝑗1 , 𝑐
𝑗
2 , . . . , 𝑐
𝑗
𝑘
⟩ in a
packet (Figure 3) to be broadcast in the network, using any
routing protocol.
Moreover, because we are in a Galois Field, each inter-
mediate node receiving 𝑏 encoded packets 𝑌1, 𝑌2, . . . , 𝑌𝑏
with their 𝑐𝑖1, 𝑐
𝑖
2, . . . , 𝑐
𝑖
𝑘
(𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑏) coefficients can pick
new encoding coefficients from GF(28) and can create new
packets repeating previous steps by linearly combining new
coefficients.
Step 5 (the decoding). Whenever the data collector receives
𝑚 packets, it puts the received coefficients vectors into
a matrix. If these coefficients satisfy the full rank matrix
condition [18], which means that they are all linearly
independent, the data collector can retrieve the original
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subdivided messages and thus the original data packet 𝑝
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We have to notice that the vector ⟨𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝑚⟩ is equal
to the original one (⟨𝑝1, 𝑝2, . . . , 𝑝𝑘⟩) and is ordered regardless
of the 𝑌𝑖 reception order (i.e., there is no particular order for
the 𝑌𝑖 vector’s elements in order to decode).The original data
𝑝 is then obtained by assembling 𝑝𝑖 together.
Thus, the idea is to use network coding in addition to
randombehavior to create resilient routing protocols as it will
be detailed in Section 5.1.
5. Resilience Evaluation
Resilience evaluation of the proposed resilientmethods based
on network coding is presented in this section and compared
to the previous resilient methods based on random behavior
and packet replications. The focus of our simulations is
comparing four GBR versions in terms of the resilience
metric presented in Section 5.2. GBR has been preferred to
other routing protocols as the classical version has obtained
the best results in terms of resilience metric according to
[8]. The four versions of the GBR routing protocol under
study described in Section 5.1 are (i) random variant without
data redundancy (RS-GBR), (ii) random behavior with data
replication at the sources (RM-GBR), (iii) random variant
with network coding without ACK mechanism (RS-GBR-
NC), and (iv) random variant with network coding with
ACK mechanism (RS-GBR-NC-ACK). The first two variants
introduce the previous methods and the last two variants
provide the new proposed methods.
5.1. Routing Protocols under Study. GBR [19] is a classical
flooding based routing protocol well adapted for constraint
environment such asWSNs and smartmetering. It constructs
the routes incrementally using gradient information.Thedata
collector floods an INIT packet in order to set up a gradient.
The INIT packet records the number of hops taken from the
data collector.Then anode candiscover itsminimumnumber
of hops from the data collector, called the node “height.” The
height difference between a node and one of its neighbors is
the gradient on that link.Then source nodes send their DATA
packets to one of theirminimumgradient neighbors and their
neighbors do the same until the data collector is reached
constructing a single route that guarantees the shortest path.
5.1.1. Previous Resilient Methods. Instead of fixed routes with
minimal gradients, Random Gradient Based Routing (RS-
GBR) avoids deterministic routing by introducing some
random choices in the next hop selection. Before forwarding,
a node randomly chooses a next hop among its neighbors
with a certain probability depending on the distance to the
data collector [8]. More precisely, a node divides its next hop
node possibilities into two groups: the subset of neighbors
closer to the data collector, that is, the set of nodes with next
hop gradient = node’s gradient− 1, and the subset of neighbors
with the same height as itself, that is, the set of nodes with
next hop gradient = node’s gradient. The node will randomly
choose a next hop in the first group with a probability
𝑃(𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑝) equal to 0.8 andwill randomly choose a next hop
in the second group with probability 𝑃(𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 ℎ𝑜𝑝) equal to
0.2. Thus, longer routes are generated but the route diversity
for each DATA packet is guaranteed; thus several messages
may take potentially different routes and routes are never the
same. In this way, malicious nodes are not as powerful as if
they were on a static route.
The classical shortest path routing protocols cannot
take advantage of data replication as each source uses the
same route for all messages, while the randomized versions
combined with data replication may increase the delivery
success thanks to multiple paths. Random Gradient Based
Routing with Replication (RM-GBR) replicates a packet a
chosen number of times and sends it this number of times
over different randomly chosen paths using the RS-GBR
randommechanism. For our simulation, RM-GBR replicates
two times each DATA packet at the source. Thus, if the
original packet is lost, some replicated copies could reach the
data collector successfully increasing the probability of the
transmission success for each message.
5.1.2. The Proposed Resilient Methods. To show the benefits
of network coding in terms of resilience, we designed an
Intrasession Network Coding RandomGradient Based Routing
(RS-GBR-NC) protocol. In this alternative, the DATA packets
are coded at the source. The number of generated encoded
submessages is fixed and is equal to 16. The original message
size is equal to 32 bits and is divided into four 8-bit sub-
messages to use coefficients from GF(28). Then, when a node
wants to send a DATA message, it generates 16 encoded
messages with coefficients taken over GF(28). Those encoded
messages will take different randomly chosen paths using
the RS-GBR mechanism. When the data collector receives
enough packets (to retrieve the original message, the data
collector needs at least four coded packets), it decodes the
message and drops any other related incoming packets. Each
packet generated from the same original message has a
unique ID identifying the original message, the coded data,
and the coding vector used to code the submessages.
We also propose Random Gradient Based Routing with
Network Coding and Acknowledgment (RS-GBR-NC-ACK)
which is a slight improvement of RS-GBR-NC. In this
version, the number of coded packets is not fixed. Instead,
an acknowledgmentmechanism is introduced to dynamically
generate coded packets. As soon as the data collector achieves
a successful decoding, it sends back to the node an acknowl-
edgment message to stop the coded packets generation. To
ensure that each coded packet possesses enough time to reach
the data collector and to avoid useless packets generation, a
delay between each coded packet generation is introduced.
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Figure 4: Average delivery ratio and energy consumption depend-
ing on the maximum number of generated coded packets while
waiting for an ACK with 50% malicious nodes.
Moreover, the introduction of an ACK mechanism with
unlimited retransmission (i.e., the sender continues to gen-
erate new coded packets while it has not retrieved any ACK
from the data collector) highlights the fact that some nodes
will never be able to communicate with the data collector.
Indeed, some devices could be completely disconnected from
the network due to a massive presence of malicious nodes in
their neighborhood. In this case, these nodes unnecessarily
create and send an unlimited amount of messages leading
to consumption of a lot of energy in the network for
nothing.
This possibility leads to bounding the number of coded
packets generated while the node is waiting for the data
collector ACK to limit the energy exhaustion of disconnected
nodes. Figure 4 shows the results of the increase of the
maximum number of generated packets in terms of energy
consumption and average delivery ratio while being in an
environment with 50% of malicious nodes. As a reference,
the values of energy consumption and average delivery ratio
of the RS-GBR-NC in the same attacker context are also
added to Figure 4. As shown in Figure 4, a good compromise
between the average delivery ratio and the energy consump-
tion seems to be for 32 generated coded packets. Indeed,
having a number of retransmissions greater than 64 does
not improve the average delivery ratio while increasing the
energy consumption; and choosing a number of retransmis-
sions equal to 16 leads to lowering the average delivery ratio
when compared with RS-GBR-NC even if it greatly decreases
the energy consumption. Thus, if the number of generated
coded packets is equal to 32, the average delivery ratio is
increased by 20% with a slightly lower energy consumption
when compared with RS-GBR-NC.
Thus, in the rest of this paper, we choose a number of
generated coded packets equal to 32 in the case of RS-GBR-
NC-ACK.
5.2. Resilience Metric. A new metric to measure and thus
quantify resilience has been proposed in [5]. This metric
introduces a new method to aggregate meaningfully several
performance metrics using a two-dimensional graphical
representation, because of the numerous manifestations of
resilient behavior with respect to various performance met-
rics. The average packet delivery alone is not enough to rep-
resent the resilience andwe should consider it in combination
with several other performance parameters such as fairness,
protocol overhead, delay, and average throughput. To obtain
a comprehensive measure of resilience, all these metrics need
to be somehow meaningfully aggregated. The new resilience
metric provides an equiangular polygon surface for each
protocol to represent its resilience, where each performance
metric is presented by an axis (see Figure 5). Not only does
this method allow discerning visually various trade-offs,
but also a quantitative value is obtained by computing the
polygon surface.
For more comprehensive description, let us consider 𝑛
routing protocols to compare according to 𝑚 performance
metrics. A routing protocol 𝑖 (𝑖 ≥ 𝑛) is presented by the
resilience surface of its performance vector 𝑝󸀠
𝑖
(𝑘), where 𝑘 is
the attack intensity (𝑘 = {0, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%}, the
percentage of compromised nodes among all network nodes).
𝑝
󸀠
𝑖
(𝑘) = {𝑝
󸀠
𝑖,𝑗
(𝑘)} is obtained by rescaling each value
𝑝𝑖,𝑗(𝑘), expressed in its own range and unit using the follow-
ing formula:
𝑝
󸀠
𝑖,𝑗
(𝑘)
=
𝑝𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘) −min (𝑝1,𝑗 (𝑘) , . . . , 𝑝𝑛,𝑗 (𝑘))
max (𝑝1,𝑗 (𝑘) , . . . , 𝑝𝑛,𝑗 (𝑘)) −min (𝑝1,𝑗 (𝑘) , . . . , 𝑝𝑛,𝑗 (𝑘))
,
(4)
with 𝑝󸀠
𝑖,𝑗
(𝑘) ∈ [0; 1]. We need to normalize all values to
obtain a polygon surface from several performance metrics
with different units. This representation allows zooming in
on the protocol differences for an efficient comparison.
Following the work of [5], the resilience could also be
directly computed as the area of the polygon using the
following formula:
𝑅𝑖 (𝑘)
= (
𝑛−1
∑
𝑗=1
(𝑝𝑖,𝑗 (𝑘) 𝑝𝑖,𝑗+1 (𝑘)) + 𝑝𝑖,𝑛𝑝𝑖,1)
1
2
sin(2𝜋
𝑛
) .
(5)
A routing protocol is considered as resilient if this com-
putation stays constant when the percentage 𝑘 of attackers
increases.
5.3. Resilience Parameters. In the context of smart metering,
data gathering should be firstly successful, secondly efficient,
and finally fairly distributed among all network nodes. The
following five performance parameters were selected for the
resilience metric evaluation:
(1) Average Delivery Ratio (ADR). It is defined as the
fraction of the number of received packets by a
data collector and the number of sent packets by all
sources. It represents themain goal of aWSN in terms
of data delivery.
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Figure 5: Resilience surface𝑚 = 5: (a) ordinary case, (b) bad resilience, and (c) good resilience.
(2) Energy Efficiency (EE). It is defined as the efficiency
of the overall energy expenditure for all routing
generated and forwarded (CONTROL and DATA)
packets by all network nodes; this is the protocol
overhead in terms of power consumption.
(3) Delay Efficiency (DE). It is defined as the efficiency
of average time delay (including queuing, retransmis-
sions, and propagation delays) required for a packet
to go from the source to the data collector; this is a
function of the average path length (hop count). It
characterizes the network efficiency in terms of speed.
(4) Average Throughput (AT). It is defined as the average
of the maximum amount of data flows received by
a data collector per source per unit of time; this in
a sense represents the network capacity (the overall
throughput when the traffic is saturated).
(5) Delivery Fairness (DF). It is defined as the standard
deviation of the delivery ratio of each source from
the average. It characterizes both the fact that sources
eventually reach the data collector and the data deliv-
ery success distribution among the sources which
should be as uniform as possible for good geographic
coverage required in smart metering.
5.4. Assumptions and Simulation Parameters. Simulations
have been performed using the WSNet simulator [20] and
averaged over 100 trials for each case with a 95% confidence
interval. For each simulation 300 nodes were deployed
randomly through uniform distribution over a 100m × 100m
square area with a single data collector at the center. Smart
meters have a transmission range of 20m, leading to an
average node degree about 31. Table 1 sums up the simulation
parameters.
Selective forwarding attack [6, 10] is considered, where
forwarding malicious nodes (𝑘% of randomly designated
compromised nodes among all network nodes) drop all
data packets instead of retransmitting. This attack is rel-
evant in the context of smart metering because the data
reliability characterizes the delivery success of routing pro-
tocols; the given attack is easy to launch for an adver-
sary and it is common to all routing protocols under
study.
Table 1: Summary of the simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Number of nodes 300
Area size 100 × 100 meters
Transmission range 20 meters
Topology Uniformly distributed
Traffic generation Poisson distribution 𝜆 = 1 packet per second
Simulation time 100 seconds
Number of packets 30000
Number of runs 100
5.5. Results and Analysis. The focus of our simulations in
this subsection is the comparison of the four variants of
GBR routing protocol with the previous methods (RS-GB
and RM-GBR) and the new proposedmethods (RS-GBR-NC
and RS-GBR-NC-ACK) as described in Section 5.1 in terms
of resilience polygon diagram and of resilience surface.
The resilience quantitative evaluation of the four proto-
cols along the 5 axes (ADR, DE, EE, AT, and DF) defined
in Section 5.3 is shown in Figure 6. The different protocols
exhibit different behaviors. Firstly, as shown in Figure 7, there
is a gap between RS-GBR on the one hand and RM-GBR,
RS-GBR-NC, and RS-GBR-NC-ACK on the other hand in
terms of energy efficiency (EE). Indeed, RM-GBR, RS-GBR-
NC, and RS-GBR-NC-ACK transmit more packets than RS-
GBR to achieve a successful delivery. As the normalization
is computed according to the best result (here RS-GBR),
their energy efficiencies become close to zero. However, RS-
GBR-NC-ACK has a better energy behavior than RS-GBR-
NC when few malicious nodes are present in the network.
Secondly and as shown in Figure 8, we observe the same
behavior with the average throughput (AT) metric. As RS-
GBR-NC generates 16 times more packets, and because the
network capacity is never saturated, this protocol presents a
huge throughput compared to RS-GBR, RM-GBR, and RS-
GBR-NC-ACK. This leads to the fact that their metrics are
close to zero due to normalization and that the throughput
variations are not significant.
Finally and as shown in Figure 9, we observe quite the
same thing concerning the delay efficiency (DE), but the
8 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
ADR
DE
EE
DF
AT
(a) RS-GBR
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
ADR
DE
EE
DF
AT
(b) RM-GBR
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
ADR
DE
EE
DF
AT
k = 50%
k = 30%
k = 0%
(c) RS-GBR-NC
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
ADR
DE
EE
DF
AT
k = 50%
k = 30%
k = 0%
(d) RS-GBR-NC-ACK
Figure 6: Resilience area depending on the percentage of malicious nodes according to the 5 metrics defined in Section 5.3.
result is not as sharply contrasted as the previous ones. RS-
GBR-NC is less efficient due to the fact that the decoding to
the data collector is time consuming and that it has to wait
until there are enough packets in order to decode. Due to
the delay introduction in RS-GBR-NC-ACK to mitigate the
number of generated coded packets, this version is slightly
below RS-GBR-NC in terms of delay efficiency.
The resilience surface evolution over the percentage of
malicious nodes is presented in Figure 10.
As shown in Figure 10, RS-GBR has the best resilience
surface over the other protocols.This is mostly due to the fact
that RS-GBR has greater energy efficiency than the others.
But the resilience surface evolution of RS-GBR is not as good
as the others. More precisely, the RS-GBR resilience falls
quicker than the others when the malicious nodes increase
from 0% to 20%.This means that this protocol is less resilient
than the others to the malicious nodes increase. In the same
way, RS-GBR-NC has about the same constant decrease as
RS-GBR: its resilience to malicious nodes increase has always
the same intensity.
Oppositely, RM-GBR resilience falls less quicker during
the same malicious nodes increase, which means that it
is more resilient to the first increases. The introduction
of redundancy when RM-GBR is in use means that even
if there is a malicious node on one path, a duplicated
packet takes another path which could be malicious-nodes-
free. So, redundancy introduction could be seen as a good
compromise when the number of malicious nodes present in
the network does not exceed 30%.
Concerning RS-GBR-NC-ACK, when the percentage of
malicious nodes is below 20%, we could see that RS-GBR-
NC-ACK has very low variations and that its resilience
surface stays constant. This flat curve means that RS-GBR-
NC-ACK is very resilient when the number of malicious
nodes begins to increase. However, this protocol has a low
resilience value because the flat evolution has a strong cost in
terms of delay efficiency and energy efficiency.
Finally, considering only the good delivery of informa-
tion, regardless of the delay and the energy consumption,
Figure 11 presents the results obtained for average delivery
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Figure 8: Evolution of average throughput in the presence of
malicious nodes.
ratio alone. The first noticeable thing is that there is a
clear gap in terms of delivery ratio between solutions with
multiple packets generation (RM-GBR, RS-GBR-NC, and
RS-GBR-NC-ACK) and the other (RS-GBR). For solutions
with multiple packets, clearly and as shown in Figure 11, the
overall network keeps a good average delivery ratio longer
before the fall than RS-GBR whereas RS-GBR sees its average
delivery ratio falls as soon as there are some malicious nodes
in the network. Among the solutions with multiple packets
generation the best one is clearly RS-GBR-NC-ACK which
has a graceful degradation and thus allows a large number of
malicious nodes before having an average delivery ratio below
90% even if this good behavior has a cost as seen before.
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Figure 9: Evolution of average throughput in the presence of
malicious nodes.
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Figure 10: Resilience surface evaluation in the presence ofmalicious
nodes.
We also should notice that because of the nature of
the resilience computation, the order of the parameters
matters as noticed in [8]. They are acting as a weighting
of each other. Using the same experimental protocol as in
[21], delay efficiency weights the average delivery ratio, and
energy efficiency weights both delay efficiency and average
throughput. Even if the importance of the axes position was
clearly justified in [21], as we deal here with protocols based
on redundancy to achieve good deliveries and because of the
sharp contrasts between delay efficiency, energy consump-
tion, and average throughput, maybe another parameters
order could be more relevant in this particular case.
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malicious nodes.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have compared using the metric introduced
in [5] the resilience of several routing protocols that exploit
redundancy under maliciously packet dropping attacks. We
essentially compared redundant methods which are data
replication and network coding. Simulation results show
that even if RS-GBR has the best resilience surface, the
versions that include network coding especially RS-GBR-
NC-ACK keep the same resilience surface when the number
of attackers increases leading us to think that there is no
performance degradation. Moreover, we show that, in terms
of average delivery ratio, the routing protocols with multiple
packets strategies clearly behave better than RS-GBR.
So, in summary, we proposed somemethods that are able
to maintain a high average delivery ratio even in the presence
of many attackers and even if they have of course an energy
cost to pay.
In near future, we plan to modify the resilience metric
itself to better take into account, in the context of multiple
packet protocols, the gain in terms of average delivery ratio.
In the same research direction, the average throughputmetric
may introduce a bias because, in all cases, we do not achieve
the network capacity. We think of using a better parameter
like “Goodput” to characterize the quantity of useful data
received by time unit.
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